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Previous studies, using data from the 1980s, found that racial composition of NBA teams is positively correlated with
racial composition of the metropolitan markets in which the teams are located. Researchers have interpreted this evidence
as consistent with a “customer discrimination” hypothesis.  We reconsider this hypothesis by examining evidence from
the 1990s and generate three principal findings.  First, based on player performance statistics, we find no evidence of
discrimination at the league level--that is, the best players appear to be playing in the league regardless of race.  Second,
players, categorized by race, are not randomly distributed across teams.  Instead, the relationship between team racial
composition and metropolitan area racial composition, while weaker than in the 1980s, persists in the NBA in the 1990s.
 Hence, teams located in areas with greater concentration of white population may find it revenue enhancing to cater to
customer demand for viewing teams that include white players.  Our third finding, based on revenue from home game
attendance, is that as the number of white players declined significantly over the decade, the revenue product of a white
player increased on the margin.  This effect appears to be more pronounced for teams located in cities with larger white
populations. We also find evidence that, in recent years, the top-performing white players in the NBA tend to locate in
cities with larger white populations, suggesting that teams in these cities place a higher marginal value on such players.
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Evidence from the 1990s
Applied to professional sports, Becker’s (1971) concept of racial discrimination by customers
implies a fan preference for watching players of their own race.  The “customer discrimination”
hypothesis suggests that teams lose revenue and profits when they adopt color-neutral hiring
practices.  Accordingly, unlike discrimination by employers and by fellow workers, discrimination
by customers is unlikely to disappear even in the long run (Nardinelli and Simon, 1990).   While
discrimination by customers generally cannot be disentangled from other influences on hiring
practices and wage scales, a recent survey of four major metropolitan areas provides evidence that
customer discrimination may be quite pervasive in today’s economy--with strong discrimination
effects emerging when employees have significant contact with customers (Holzer and Ihlanfeldt,
1998).
It is hard to imagine a business where employees are more “visible” to customers than
professional basketball.  Consistent with the customer discrimination hypothesis, a number of
studies, using data from the 1980s, found that National Basketball Association (NBA) teams located
in more white-dominated market areas consistently had a disproportionately large share of white
players (Koch and Vander Hill, 1988; Brown, Spiro and Keenan, 1991; Burdekin and Idson, 1991;
Hoang and Rascher, 1999; Bodvarsson and Partridge, 2001).
1  Evidence is mixed, however, as to
whether teams can increase their attendance and revenues by “matching” the racial profile of their
players with their market’s racial profile.  Burdekin and Idson (1991) and Hoang and Rascher (1999)
found that a positive match between team racial composition and the racial composition of the
                                                          
1 Early studies using 1970s data find similar results.  See Markham (1976) and Karabel and Karen (1982).2
SMSA area increases attendance.  Kahn and Sherer (1988) add that white players increased
attendance more than enough to compensate for the white salary premium they identify for the 1980-
86 period.  On the other hand, Dey (1997), using data from 1987-93, and McCormick and Tollison
(2001), using data from 1980-88, saw no relationship between the racial match and NBA
attendance.
2
In this paper we use NBA team data from the 1990s to re-examine the customer
discrimination hypothesis.  Our approach has three parts.  We first analyze trends in the racial
composition of NBA teams and document the distribution of players, classified by race, across
teams.  We then analyze differences in the performance of black and white players to test the
hypothesis that teams in the league engage in “window dressing” by adding white players to their
rosters who are not as strong as black players. Finally, we examine what determines the racial
composition of NBA teams and assess whether a team can increase its attendance by matching its
racial composition with the racial composition of the metropolitan area where the team is located.
Team Racial Composition and Player Performance in the NBA in the 1990s
Using annual data over the 1990-1999 period, we find that total white representation in the
NBA shrank considerably over our sample period, from just over 25% in the 1990-91 season to 20%
in the 1998-99 season (see Figure 1).  This result corresponds with declining white representation
on the bench, which fell from 30% to 23%.  There has been little change in the percentage of starters
who are white, however, which remained below 15% across most of the sample period.
                                                          
2Discrimination by customers may have an impact not only at the professional level but also at the college basketball
level.  Brown and Jewell (1994, 1995) find that white players in the 1988-89 NCAA season generated significantly more
team (school) revenue than did black players of comparable ability.  3
As Table 1 shows, white players and black players are unevenly distributed across NBA
teams.  While on average the Chicago Bulls and Utah Jazz teams were just over 33% white during
the 1990s, at the other extreme the New York Knicks and Toronto Raptors were under 10% white.
 Many factors besides customer preferences could lie behind the varying racial compositions of NBA
teams, including the race of available draft picks, existing contractual obligations, the availability
of free agents, and increased player demand arising from two expansion teams (Toronto Raptors and
Vancouver Grizzlies).
While the number of white players in the NBA has declined over the decade, we do not find
any systematic change in the allocation of white players across teams, or of white starters across
teams.  This finding is based on calculating Herfindahl-Hirshman measures of the concentration of
white players across the league to assess whether there has been a shift toward more concentration
of white players in cities with proportionally larger white populations.
3
Further, there is no evidence, at least in recent years, that fan preferences for watching
players of their own race have led to inferior white players entering the NBA in place of more skilled
black counterparts.  Not only has the overall representation of white players in the NBA declined in
recent years, but also the performance levels of white players and black players appear similar.  In
Table 2 we use annual player statistics for 1996-97 through 1998-99 to compare the average
performance of whites and blacks.  We examine starters and bench players separately across a broad
range of measures, and include points scored, assists, rebounds, blocks, steals, field-goal percentage
and free-throw percentage.
4  “Starters” are the top five players on each team in terms of minutes
                                                          
3 The Herfindahl-Hirshman Index 
 (HHI)







2 where si is team i’s share of the league’s
players who are white and n= number of teams in the league. 
4 We include all of the variables incorporated by Hofler and Payne (1997) in their measure of the overall efficiency of4
played per game.  “Bench players” constitute the remainder.  Although there are differences in a few
specific skill measures for black players and white players, Table 2 reveals no systematic tendency
for players of one race to outperform those of the other.  For example, black starters and bench
players outperform white players in average number of steals per minute played, and white starters
outperform black starters in field-goal and free-throw percentages.
Because team managers do not select players based on only one skill (e.g., three-point
percentage or steals per game), we also examine whether there is any difference in the breadth of
skills that black players and white players possess on average.  Table 3 reveals that correlations
between pairs of performance measures are similar for white and blacks.  The table shows that the
correlations between performance measures are always the same sign and are of similar magnitudes
whether the player is white or black.  That is, whites and blacks appear to possess similar
combinations of skills as well as exhibiting similar individual performance statistics.
An alternative way of measuring player performance is to compile a composite performance
index for each player.  We construct such an index by standardizing and averaging the following nine
performance statistics: field-goal percentage, free-throw percentage, three-point percentage,
offensive rebounds per minute, defensive rebounds per minute, assists per minute, steals per minute,
blocks per minute, and total points per minute.  Each of the nine statistics is standardized by the
mean of the sample (starters or bench) for that statistic, and then we equally-weight and sum the
standardized statistics to arrive at the composite performance index for a player.  While the index
is significantly higher for white starters than for black starters (0.084 versus -0.014, t-statistic = -
3.10), the difference of only a 0.098 standard deviation in average performance does not appear to
                                                                                                                                                                                          
NBA teams.  Classifying players according to their playing position (Appendix A) does not alter the overall picture
apparent in Table 2.5
be economically significant.  Further, the average performance of white starters may be inflated by
the fact that they play about two minutes less per game (30.52 minutes versus 32.65 minutes, t-
statistic = -2.25), and hence may be fresher when they do play.  In contrast, the performance index
for white bench players is lower than for black bench players, but not significantly so (-0.068 versus
0.019, t-statistic = -1.10), while they also play slightly fewer minutes per game (14.18 minutes versus
15.45 minutes, t-statistic = -2.02).  Though weighting the performance statistics equally is arbitrary,
the evidence does not support the hypothesis that the league engages in “window dressing” by hiring
and playing whites when better-performing blacks are available.   
We base our white and black performance level findings on player data from the last three
seasons of the 1990s; a period during which there is little evidence of overall salary discrimination
against blacks in the NBA.  Indeed, the NBA appears to have changed markedly in this regard since
the 1980s, when a number of studies found that whites were paid more than blacks for the same level
of performance (see Kahn, 2000).
5  While most of the salary-based studies focus on aggregate
measures of performance and salaries, a few consider how the fan base in a metro area may
differentially affect salaries.  For example, Bodvarsson and Partridge (2001) find that black players
in two seasons (1985/86 and 1990/91) were paid more in areas where the black population was
higher.  They argue that this finding may reflect “black fans wanting to see a team with a greater
percentage of blacks” (Bodvarsson and Partridge, 2001: 413).  While no such population effect was
significant in their regressions of white player salary levels, the possibility that black-white salary
levels may vary with the racial composition of the market area is consistent with the customer
                                                          
5 Hoang and Rascher (1999) also find evidence of “exit discrimination” in the 1980s with white players facing 36% less
risk of being cut from a team than did black players with otherwise similar characteristics.   However, as Kahn (2000)
documents, data from the early to mid-1990s generally offer much less support for salary discrimination against blacks
in the NBA (see, for example, Dey, 1997, Hamilton, 1997; Guis and Johnson, 1998; Bodvarsson and Brastow, 1999).6
discrimination hypothesis.  Even if average performance-adjusted salary levels of whites and blacks
are equal, so that there is no aggregate discrimination, this does not preclude team-specific, or
market-area-specific, differences in the relative salaries of whites and blacks.
6
Determinants of the Racial Composition of NBA Teams
A match between the racial composition of an NBA team and the racial composition of its
metropolitan market suggests that teams are responding to customer discrimination.  We examine
the relation between the racial composition of teams and their respective markets using SMSA and
NBA team data from the 1990-91 through 1998-99 seasons.  We measure team racial composition
in three ways:  the percentage of all team members who are white; the percentage of a team’s bench
players who are white; and the percentage of a team’s starting players who are white.  Appendix B
gives the variable definitions and sources.  Customer discrimination implies a positive relationship
between the team racial composition and the metro area racial composition.
We also expect team racial composition will be more important in smaller metropolitan
markets because such markets have fewer potential customers to fill an arena’s seats.  Assuming that
some fraction of local customers have a propensity to discriminate, a team’s management would be
less likely to accommodate such customers if it could fill its arena seats with non-discriminating
customers.  It is more likely that non-discriminating customers are marginal demanders of seats when
the market area population is large relative to stadium size.  In the regressions below we account for
this by entering the ratio of stadium capacity to total population in the market area as an independent
variable.  We expect an inverse relationship between the ratio of stadium capacity to population and
                                                          
6 Bodvarsson and Partridge (2001) also point to possible co-worker discrimination through the effect of team composition
on salaries.  They find that white players are paid more, ceteris paribus, when the team becomes less white.  It is not
clear, however, whether any such effect really implies co-worker discrimination.  It could instead reflect an attempt by
teams to maintain at least some measure of ethnic diversity.  Former owner of the Cleveland Cavaliers, Ted Stepien even
went on record claiming: “You need a blend of black and white.  I think that draws, and I think that’s a better team.” (see7
the percentage of white players on a team.  A time trend variable controls for time-dependent
changes in the racial composition of teams.
Table 4 gives the regression results for the three dependent variables that measure team racial
composition.   We use a clustering technique (where each team is a cluster) to reflect the possibility
that observations are independent across clusters, but not necessarily independent within clusters.
 Hence, the reported t-statistics for the coefficients are based on robust standard errors estimated with
clustering.
7  Results are consistent with expectations.  As a determinant of overall team composition,
and of starters, the percent white of the SMSA population (POPWHITE) is significant at the 95%
confidence level.  It is not significant in the bench regression, however, suggesting that the primary
focus of customer discrimination is on starters.  The stadium capacity variable is significant in the
three regressions at the 95%, 90% and 85% confidence levels, respectively, while the time trend is
significant at the 95% level in the full-team and bench regressions but not in the starter regression.
8
 As documented earlier, the ratio of white to black starters remained relatively constant over the
decade.
Although there appears to have been sufficient player mobility to allow teams to “sort” the
racial composition of players over our 1990s sample period, there is still a question as to whether
the teams or the free agents themselves determine who plays on what team.  Researchers typically
assume that the teams’ preferences are dominant.  Nevertheless, we acknowledge that any influence
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Karabel and Karen, 1982: 24). 
7 Given that the percentages are, of course, censored at 0 and 100, we also examined the effects of re-estimating our
equations using a Tobit procedure.  This did not materially affect the coefficient estimates but, as we cannot correct
the standard errors for clustering when applying Tobit, we place more confidence in the OLS results reported in
Table 4.  The need to correct for clustering follows from the fact that our multiple observations of the same teams
cannot reasonably be viewed as independent from year to year.
8 Our empirical finding (of a statistically significant relationship between the racial composition of teams and the racial
composition of corresponding metropolitan areas) holds whether or not we exclude the two expansion teams, for which
data are available only from 1995 onward.  8
of player preferences would also likely militate towards a matching of white players with whiter
market areas.  In an extreme expression of such player preferences, Isaiah Rider, a black Trailblazer
team member, called the relatively white city of Portland a “racist area” (see Wertheim, 2001: 44).
 Despite its shock value, this quote offers support for the premise that team preferences are what
ultimately matter most.  Rider remained with the Portland Trailblazers for three seasons and, after
becoming a free agent, eventually signed with the Denver Nuggets in October 2001–another team
located in a smaller NBA city not noted for having a large black population.  The implication is that
players may have preferences for particular teams, but in a competitive market for players, they do
not have sufficient market power to select teams and teammates that match their individual
preferences.
9  However, we leave open the possibility that some players, most likely top-performing
starters, have sufficient monopsony power to select among NBA teams.
Racial Matching and Revenue Gains
Basketball teams generate revenue primarily from two sources:  television contracts and
home game attendance. The NBA bylaws and constitution require that teams pool and share
television and cable revenue, but allow teams to retain all home game attendance revenue (less a 4%
assessment fee).  For our purposes, the NBA’s revenue-sharing arrangement is important because
a substantial fraction of a team’s revenue comes from local sources.
10  Accordingly, if customer
                                                          
9 Meanwhile, teams’ abilities to bid freely for the players they want do not seem to have been constrained in any
meaningful way by the post-1983 “salary cap” as there are numerous exceptions to this limit–including the “Bird
Exception,” which allows a team to acquire players from others teams up to the level of the salary cap and then freely
bid above the salary cap to keep any of its own players who have become free agents (Hill and Grotthuis, 2001: 133).
 Wage setting in the NBA does seem to have been significantly altered by the subsequent 1998 collective bargaining
agreement, with Hill and Grotthuis (2001) documenting a reduction in wage dispersion after this new policy took effect.
 This could have no more than a minimal impact on our empirical work, however, as we end our sample in 1999.
10 Although the influence of national broadcasting revenue has grown in recent years, over 65% of the average NBA
team’s revenue still came from local sources in 1996 (Wilson, 2001).  Under the NBA Constitution and By-laws, the
teams receive all revenue from the sale of tickets to regular season home games (subject to the NBA gate assessment of
4%) and no revenue from sale of tickets to regular season away games.  Generally, the teams retain all revenues from
the sale of tickets to home exhibition games.  Based on SEC annual report filings by the only publicly traded NBA team,9
demand for tickets depends on a team’s racial profile, profit-maximizing managers will internalize
the revenue impact of the local market’s racial preferences.
11
In a cross-sectional analysis, the empirical effect that team racial composition has on ticket
revenue is complicated.  Assuming that black and white players are of equal performance quality,
finding no relation between team racial composition (TWHITE) and ticket revenue is consistent with
either of two hypotheses: (1) fans are indifferent to race so that team race, per se, does not affect
ticket revenue, or (2) fans are not indifferent, but markets are in equilibrium with regard to race
except for random errors.  Similarly, finding a positive relationship between TWHITE and revenue
also raises two possible interpretations:  (1) black players and white players are of equal quality but
customers are not indifferent to race and demand a greater percentage of white players on the team
than managers supply, or (2) consumers do not care about race but players are sorted across teams
such that the average quality of white players on a team is positively correlated with the percent of
the team that is white (TWHITE).  Applying these possible interpretations to our cross-sectional
analysis of team racial composition, window dressing implies that the coefficient on TWHITE will
be positive if all markets have similar demand for white players, and that the ratio of TWHITE to
PWPOP will be positive if demand for white players is higher in markets with higher white
populations.  Finally, if higher quality white players tend to play for teams with relatively high
percentages of white players, then the cross-sectional coefficient on TWHITE will be positive due
                                                                                                                                                                                          
the Boston Celtics, we find that over the period 1993-2000, ticket sales represented 49.3% of total revenue and TV
revenues represented 39.3%.  Other sources of revenue made up the remainder.    
11 Looking at Nielsen ratings for local broadcasts of NBA games during the 1996-97 season, Kanazawa and Funk (2001)
found that these ratings were positively related to the number of white players represented on the two teams.  A
qualification is that the Chicago Bulls, shown in our Table 1 to be the whitest NBA team over the 1990-1999 period, may
have boosted the Nielsen ratings not only through the Bulls’ racial profile but also by featuring the returning superstar
Michael Jordan.  Thus the findings of Kanazawa and Funk for the 1996-97 season may, to some extent, conflate a fan
response to greater white representation with a “Michael Jordan effect.”10
to the correlation between white player quality and TWHITE.  To examine how these relationships
have changed over the years of our study, we interact the measure of the racial mix of the team with
a time trend (TIME).
12 
Table 5 presents three alternative specifications.  We measure home-game revenue as
average ticket price times average attendance at home games.  We include variables to control for
the effect of team winning percentage, the number of competing major professional sport franchises
(NFL, NHL and MLB), stadium capacity, SMSA average income, and SMSA total population.  The
coefficient estimates are based on robust standard errors.   All the control variables are significant
at the 95% confidence level or better, and have the expected signs.  In addition, the time trend is
significant and positive, reflecting both rising attendance and rising ticket prices during the 1990s.
13
The three specifications use alternative measures to reflect the racial mix of a team.  The first
regression is the most parsimonious and includes the percentage of team members who are white
(TWHITE) as an independent variable. The coefficient on TWHITE is positive, but attains only the
80% confidence level.  Statistically, game revenue is more dependent on such variables as the size
of the population in the SMSA market area, stadium capacity, the team’s winning percentage, and
the number of professional sports franchises in the SMSA.  Nonetheless, interpreting the coefficient
as a best estimate, a one percent increase in TWHITE would yield approximately $1,000 in extra
revenue per game, other things constant (approximately $8,000 per white player).  As a benchmark,
average revenue per game was $512,000 over the decade so the incremental revenue of adding a
white player is less than 2% of total revenue.
                                                          
12 We interact team white with time rather than using a random effects model because of the degrees of freedom
limitations.  The restriction appears to be reasonable given the systematic change (approximately linear) in team
composition apparent from Figure 1. 11
The estimated coefficient on TWHITE, however, conflates both time series and cross-
sectional effects.  Consequently, we cannot be certain how to interpret the positive coefficient.  In
a cross-sectional regression, a positive sign is consistent with discrimination by customers (managers
undersupplying white players relative to demand) but is also consistent with the hypothesis that
higher quality white players participate on teams with more white players.  Nevertheless, we know
from Figure 1 that time series considerations are important because TWHITE was higher in the
earlier part of the decade.  Hence, higher customer demand to see white players in the early 1990s
could drive TWHITE’s positive relationship with revenue. 
To control for time-series effects, our second specification adds a variable that interacts time
with TWHITE (TIME *TWHITE).  The level of the percentage white on a team, by itself, is now
negative but not statistically significant.  When interacted with time, however, the percentage white
has a significant positive value.  For example, according to the second set of results, and ignoring
statistical significance, TWHITE had a negative total effect on revenue (the implied coefficient is
–0.69, i.e., -1.25 + 1*0.56) during the 1990-91 season.   This suggests an excess supply of white
players relative to demand but is also consistent with the hypothesis that white players, on the
margin, were of lower quality than black players.  In contrast, during the 1998-99 season, TWHITE
had a positive impact on revenue (the implicit coefficient is 3.70, i.e., -1.25 + 9*0.56).  Over the
1998-99 season, the marginal revenue product of adding one white player (an 8.3% increase in
TWHITE) was $31,000 per home game, or about $1.35 million of home-game revenue during the
regular season.  As discussed above, the positive coefficient supports both hypotheses of customer
discrimination: that fan demand for white players exceeds the supply, and that teams with higher
concentrations of white players also have higher caliber white players.  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
13 Again, results are not sensitive to inclusion of the two expansion teams, Toronto and Vancouver.12
The third specification uses an alternative measure of racial mix: the ratio of the percent of
the team that is white to the percent of the SMSA population that is white (TWHITE/POPWHITE).
 While not shown, this variable, if included by itself without a time interaction, has a marginally
significant positive impact on revenue (as in the first case).  When we interact the matching variable
with time, however, the results are similar to those of our second specification: the statistical and
economic importance of racial matching becomes more pronounced over time, and gives rise to
similar-sized incremental revenues when evaluated at the white population mean.  The driving factor
is clearly the interaction with the time trend.  As shown in Table 5, this compound variable is
significant at the 90% level and the positive sign supports the hypothesis that higher quality white
players go to teams with higher white SMSA populations.  Furthermore, the 1998-99 results imply
that customers discriminate in conjunction with white-player undersupply--higher quality white
players go either to the whiter teams or to cities with higher white populations.
14
Our third specification suggests that the player selection process has led the better white
players (the “stars”) to locate in cities with larger white populations.  Using the composite measure
of performance discussed earlier in the paper, we examine the cross-sectional differences in both
bench and starter performance measures.  For bench players, we find no significant relation between
the performance index and race and population.  We do find such a systematic relation for starters,
however.  Equation (1) below gives the results of an OLS regression with 435 observations of
                                                          
14 It appears that toward the end of the decade, teams in whiter areas may well have placed increasingly greater emphasis
on retaining any white players that they had.  We attempt to examine this issue indirectly by looking at the turnover of
white players and black players over our sample period.  While we find no evidence that the turnover of starters varies
by race, we do identify a possible distinction in the turnover of bench players.  Black bench players have a turnover ratio
of 20.2% (number of times a player switched teams divided by the total number of teams played on) whereas the turnover
rate for white bench players is only 16.3%.  The difference is significant at just the 86% level, however, making it
impossible to draw any definite conclusions.13
starters, where an observation is a player-year (t-statistics appear in parentheses).  The performance
data cover three seasons, 1996-97, 1997-98, and 1998-99. 
(2.871)                       ) 600 . 0 (          ) 561 . 2 (                                              
(1)                ) * ( 142 . 1 090 . 803 . 081
−
+ − − − = POPWHITE RACE POPWHITE RACE e Performanc
In the regression, the dependent variable is the standardized composite performance measure
for players based on three seasons of data and an equal weighting of the nine performance measures
referred to earlier: RACE takes on the value of 1 for white players and 0 for non-white; POPWHITE
is percentage of the SMSA population that is white expressed in decimal form.  The last term is an
interacted variable.  The regression coefficients show that in the last three NBA seasons of the 1990s,
the performance of white starters was higher in cities with larger white populations.  In combination
with the Table 5 results, Equation (1) suggests that the better-performing white starters have
navigated toward locations that place a higher premium on their performance.
15  Such a result is
consistent with customer discrimination, although of a more limited type than was documented in
studies using 1980s data. 
Conclusion
Evidence from the 1990s is mixed on whether basketball fans are becoming indifferent to the
race of NBA players.  Clearly, the NBA and its franchised teams have prospered in the 1990s, as
both revenue from televised games and arena attendance have increased steadily.  These increases
have occurred at the same time that black player participation has increased and white player
                                                                                                                                                                                          
15 Recent evidence on salary distribution in the NBA shows that, even though the overall black-white wage
differential appears to have diminished, the degree of dispersion in NBA wages nevertheless increased over much of
the 1990s.  Hill and Grotthuis (2001) show that, whereas the mean NBA salary rose approximately 78.5% between
the 1993-94 and 1997-98 seasons, the median salary increased by just 31.3%.  Hamilton (1997), examining salary
data in the mid-90s, finds evidence that at the upper-end of the salary distribution (75
th and 90
th percentiles) whites
earn more than their black counterparts, although finds no statistical difference in salary at lower percentiles. 14
participation has decreased.  Further, our results on player performance indicate that NBA teams are
employing the most talented players irrespective of race, whether player performance is compared
by position or by starter/bench designation.  It may be premature to conclude that fans do not care
about race, however.  The tendency of teams in whiter areas to have more white players certainly has
not disappeared since the 1980s.    We continue to see a non-random “sorting” of players across
teams over our 1990-1999 sample period.  Moreover, after correcting for other factors, we find that
a “matching” of the team’s racial composition and the racial composition of the market area
positively boosts home-game-attendance revenue.  The sorting has taken on an interesting
characteristic: the most highly skilled white starters appear to locate in cities with relatively larger
white populations.  Thus, we cannot conclusively determine whether the sorting of players across
teams (or the positive revenue benefits of matching white players with a white fan base) are findings
attributable to customer discrimination alone or also to a player-quality effect.
 15
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*Note- A regression of percent of team that is white (TWHITE) on a time trend generates a negative
coefficient (t-statistic of -2.80, significant at the .01level).  A corresponding regression of percent of
bench that is white (BWHITE) on time generates a negative coefficient (t-statistic of -3.30, significant
at the .01 level).  However, the coefficient in the regression of percent of starters who are white
(SWHITE) on time is not statistically different from zero (t-statistic of -0.36).  Table 1
Racial Composition of NBA Teams, 1990-1998
The table shows, by NBA team, the mean percent of players on the team’s roster who
are white, averaged over nine seasons (1990-91 to 1998-99 season).




  Chicago 34.80%
  Utah 33.29%
  Phoenix 29.33%
  Cleveland 29.16%
  Orlando 27.92%
  Golden State 25.71%
  Seattle 25.23%
  New Jersey 25.16%
  Indiana 24.84%
  Milwaukee 24.33%
  Washington 24.29%
  Atlanta 23.56%
  Minnesota 21.63%
  Dallas 21.46%
  Charlotte 21.27%
  Sacramento 21.00%
  Boston 20.71%
  Houston 20.59%
  Miami 20.44%
  San Antonio 17.01%
  Denver 16.82%
  Vancouver* 16.10%
  Detroit 15.11%
  LA Clippers 14.19%
  Philadelphia 13.46%
  LA Lakers 13.01%
  Portland 12.21%
  New York 9.87%
  Toronto* 5.80%
  All Teams 20.97%
  US Teams 21.72%
*Data are available for only four seasons (1995-1998) for expansion teams, Toronto
and Vancouver.    Table 2
Performance Statistics for NBA Starters and Bench Players
The table shows the mean values of 12 performance measures for, in panel A), 228 NBA players classified as starters
and, in panel B), 476 NBA players classified as bench players.  The measures are averaged over three seasons (1996-
1998) that the player played as a starter, or bench player, respectively.  A player is classified as a starter if he is one of
the five players on the team who played the most total minutes over the course of the season.  A player is classified as
a bench player if he is on the team’s roster but it not one of the five players on the team who played the most total
minutes over the course of the season   Except as noted, all performance measures are standardized by total minutes
played in the season.
  A) Starters
Mean Performance Measure Performance Measure
Black Players White Players
t-test of Difference
 in Means
Assists .0915 .0903 0.102
Blocks .0193 .0259 -1.386
Defensive rebounds .1167 .1296 -1.423
Field-goal percentage .4514 .4729     -2.394**
Free-throw percentage .7402 .7713   -1.951*
Offensive rebounds .0514 .0555 -0.632
Personal fouls .0845 .0888 -0.825
Points .4082 .3969 0.703
Steals .0353 .0307     2.070**
Three-point percentage .2504 .2432 0.243
Turnovers .0608 .0601 0.214
Rebounds .1681 .1853 -1.160
 
B) Bench Players
Mean Performance Measure Performance Measure
Black Players White Players
t-test of Difference
in Means
Assists .0659 .0637     1.936**
Blocks .0203 .0235 -1.169
Defensive rebounds .1089 .1261      -2.517***
Field goals percentage .4076 .4025 0.407
Free throw percentage .6388 .6640 -1.001
Offensive rebounds .0607 .0569 0.087
Personal fouls .1155 .1426     -2.650***
Points .3348 .3128     1.654**
Steals .0366 .0296       2.602***
Three-point percentage .1828 .1985 -0.736
Turnovers .0686 .0725 -0.407
Rebounds .1693 .1823 -1.303
Note—In panel A, total sample size equals 228 (35 starters who are white and 193 starters who are black).  In panel B,
total sample size equals 476 (110 bench players who are white and 366 who are black)
*     = significant at the .10 level, two tailed test
**   = significant at the .05 level, two tailed test
*** = significant at the .01 level, two tailed test     Table 3
Pairwise Correlations Between Performance Measures
The table shows the correlations between key performance variables.  Correlations are
measured based on average performance statistics for all NBA players for the 1996-97, 1997-
98, 1998-99 seasons.  Only those correlations greater than .30 for both categories of players
are shown in the table.  The table is based on 704 observations of NBA players.  Performance
statistics are averaged over the number of seasons the player played in the league as either a
starter or bench player.
Performance Measures:  Simple Correlations* Black Players White Players
Field goal percentage/three-point percent -.507 -.448
Field goal percentage/free-throw percent -.442 -.343
Field goal percentage/offensive rebounds .545 .516
Field-goal percentage/defensive rebounds .598 .469
Field goal percentage/assists -.330 -.383
Field goal percentage/steels -.307 -.212
Field goal percentage/blocks .503 .344
Field goal percentage/personal foals .342 .403
Three-point percentage/free-throw percent .487 .791
Three-point percentage/offensive rebounds -.676 -.806
Three-point percentage/defensive rebounds -.666 -.603
Three-point percentage/assists .463 .594
Three-point percentage/steels .275 .427
Three-point percentage/blocks -.653 -.496
Free-throw percentage/offensive rebounds -.611 -.681
Free-throw percentage/defensive rebounds -.516 -.590
Free-throw percentage/assists .333 .434
Free-throw percentage/blocks -.475 -.587
Free-throw percentage/personal fouls .468 .588
Free-throw percentage/points .294 .317
Offensive rebounds/defensive rebounds .857 .829
Offensive rebounds/assists -.577 -.640
Offensive rebounds/steels -.351 -.366
Offensive rebounds/blocks .573 .737
Offensive rebounds/personal fouls .555 .746
Defensive rebounds/assists -.468 -.537
Defensive rebounds/steels -.327 -.465
Defensive rebounds/blocks .617 .773
Defensive rebounds/personal fouls .428 .644
Assists/steels .477 .630
Assists/blocks -.440 -.561
Assists/personal fouls -.472 -.626
Steels/blocks -.254 -.463
Blocks/personal fouls .411 .626
*The performance correlations are less than 0.30 for the following combinations:  field goal
percentage/steels; field goal percentage/points; three-point percentage/points; free-throw
percentage/steels; offensive rebounds/points; defensive rebounds/ points; assists/points;
steels/personal fouls; steels/ points; blocks/points; personal fouls/points.  While the
correlations are low, each correlation of skill combination is of the same sign and approximate
magnitude for black and white players.  Table 4
Models of Racial Composition of NBA Teams
The dependent variables in the models below are:  percent of the team members who are white, percent of bench players
who are white, and percent of the starters who are white.  We report the results of regressions with robust standard errors
that are corrected for clustering.  The results are based on 251 observations over nine seasons (1990-1999). 
(1)
Percent of Team White
(TWHITE) %
(2)
Percent of Bench White
(BWHITE) %
(3)








































2 0.08 0.07 0.05
*     = t-Statistic significant at  .15 level
**   = t-Statistic significant at  .10 level
*** = t-Statistics significant at .05 levelTable 5
Team Revenues from Home Game Attendance  
The models below show the natural log of home game revenue, estimated as average ticket price times average
attendance (TICKET PRICE * ATTENDANCE) as a function of explanatory variables, including the variables
describing the racial composition of the team.  The results are based on 252 observations over nine NBA seasons  (1990-
1999).  T-ratios are calculated using robust standard errors.  Variable definitions and data sources appear in Appendix
B. 







WINPER: Team winning percentage (%)    4.57***
(8.68)
   4.44***
(8.38)
   4.52***
(8.57)
COMPETITORS:  Number of competing professional
sports franchises in the city
-27.73**
(-2.42)














   11.84***
(3.48)












TWHITE: percent of team who are white (%)  1.05
(1.26)
       -1.25
(-0.84)
TWHITE*TIME        0.56*
(1.85)
(TWHITE/POPWHITE):  Ratio of percent of team who
are white to percent of SMSA population who are white




CONSTANT -595.25 -549.94 -539.21
Adj. R
2 0.61 0.62 0.61
 Robust standard errors
   *=t-Statistic significant at  .10  level
 **=t-Statistic significant at  .05  level
***=t-Statistic significant at .01 levelAppendix A
Performance Statistics for NBA Guards
The table shows the mean values of 12 performance measures for 205 NBA players classified as starters at the guard
position and 407 classified as bench guards.  The measures are averaged over three seasons (1996-97, 1997-98, and 1998-
1999).  A player is classified as a starter if he is one of the five players on the team who played the most total minutes over
the course of the season.  Except as noted, all performance measures are standardized by total minutes played in the
season. 


















Assists .124 .139        -.776 .115 .115       .007
Blocks .009 .004       4.084*** .010 .007     1.581
Defensive rebounds .078 .079       -.284 .077 .086    -1.086
Field-goal percentage .429 .436       -.453 .401 .403      -.512
Free-throw percentage .780 .814     -2.282** .670 .796    -4.070***
Offensive rebounds .026 .019      2.336** .035 .026      1.615
Personal fouls .073 .062      2.720** .095 .094        .227
Points .405 .360      2.009* .348 .322      1.187
Steals .040 .037        .892 .043 .037      1.732*
Three-point percentage .332 .374     -2.784*** .259 .314     -2.386**
Turnovers .062 .059        .672 .072 .066        .960
Rebounds .104 .099        .703 .111 .111        .012
Number of observations 94 13 162 29
Note—Total sample size equals 205 starters (25 who are white and 180 who are black) and equals 407 bench players
(61 who are white and 346 who are black)
*     = significant at the .10 level, two-tailed test
**   = significant at the .05 level, two-tailed test
*** = significant at the .01 level, two-tailed testAppendix A, cont.
Performance Statistics for NBA Centers
The table shows the mean values of 12 performance measures for 90 NBA players classified as starters at the Center
position and 233 classified as bench Centers.  The measures are averaged over three seasons (1996-97, 1997-98, and
1998-1999).  A player is classified as a starter if he is one of the five players on the team who played the most total
minutes over the course of the season.  Except as noted, all performance measures are standardized by total minutes played
in the season. 


















Assists .044 .049       -.620 .034 .034        .011
Blocks .047 .050       -.357 .046 .034      1.995**
Defensive rebounds .171 .175       -.386 .171 .146      2.021**
Field-goal percentage .487 .500     -1.002 .468 .400      2.632***
Free-throw percentage .662 .703     -1.583 .580 .603       -.531
Offensive rebounds .086 .088       -.212 .098 .078      2.944***
Personal fouls .104 .115     -1.733* .143 .177     -1.658
Points .408 .406        .078 .322 .307        .575
Steals .026 .025        .480 .027 .021      1.917*
Three-point percentage .097 .099       -.061 .040 .134     -2.661***
Turnovers .059 .061       -.422 .067 .081       -.719
Rebounds .257 .262       -.399 .269 .223      2.877***
Number of observations 31 15 61 51
Note— Total sample size equals 90 starters (25 who are white and 65 who are black) and equals 233 bench players
(99 who are white and 134 who are black)
*     = significant at the .10 level, two-tailed test
**   = significant at the .05 level, two-tailed test
*** = significant at the .01 level, two-tailed testAppendix A, cont.
Performance Statistics for NBA Forwards
The table shows the mean values of 12 performance measures for 232 NBA players classified as starters at the Forward
position and 415 classified as bench Forwards.  The measures are averaged over three seasons (1996-97, 1997-98, and
1998-1999).  A player is classified as a starter if he is one of the five players on the team who played the most total
minutes over the course of the season.  Except as noted, all performance measures are standardized by total minutes
played in the season. 


















Assists .066 .074        -.788 .048 .049        -.241
Blocks .022 .016       1.567 .025 .023         .422
Defensive rebounds .133 .126         .753 .126 .126        -.007
Field-goal percentage .463 .464        -.010 .427 .419         .500
Free-throw percentage .727 .802      -2.862** .631 .688      -1.620
Offensive rebounds .063 .050       1.737 .076 .056       3.540***
Personal fouls .090 .083       1.135 .123 .117         .690
Points .417 .402         .458 .345 .328         .751
Steals .033 .031         .932 .033 .030         .689
Three-point percentage .222 .287      -1.372 .147 .209      -1.987*
Turnovers .058 .056         .436 .065 .057       1.401
Rebounds .197 .176       1.268 .202 .182       1.890*
Number of observations 107 11 167 36
Note— Total sample size equals 232 starters (22 who are white and 210 who are black) and equals 415 bench players
(64 who are white and 351 who are black)
*     = significant at the .10 level, two-tailed test
**   = significant at the .05 level, two-tailed test
*** = significant at the .01 level, two-tailed testA
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